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We propose a method for identifying early warning signs of transformative progress in artificial intelligence 
(AI), and discuss how these can support the anticipatory and democratic governance of AI. We call these early 
warning signs ‘canaries’, based on the use of canaries to provide early warnings of unsafe air pollution in coal 
mines. Our method combines expert elicitation and collaborative causal graphs to identify key milestones 
and identify the relationships between them. We present two illustrations of how this method could be 
used: to identify early warnings of harmful impacts of language models; and of progress towards high-level 
machine intelligence. Identifying early warning signs of transformative applications can support more efficient 
monitoring and timely regulation of progress in AI: as AI advances, its impacts on society may be too great to 
be governed retrospectively. It is essential that those impacted by AI have a say in how it is governed. Early 
warnings can give the public time and focus to influence emerging technologies using democratic, participatory 






Progress in artificial intelligence (AI) research has accelerated in recent years. Applications are already changing society [1] and 
some researchers warn that continued progress could precipitate 
transformative impacts [2]–[5]. We use the term “transformative 
AI” to describe a range of possible advances with potential to impact 
society in significant and hard-to-reverse ways [6]. For example, future 
machine learning systems could be used to optimise management of 
safety-critical infrastructure [7]. Advanced language models could 
be used in ways that corrupt our online information ecosystem [8] 
and future advances in AI systems could trigger widespread labour 
automation [9]. 
There is an urgent need to develop anticipatory governance 
approaches to AI development and deployment. As AI advances, its 
impacts on society will become more profound, and some harms may 
be too great to rely on purely ‘reactive’ or retrospective governance.
Anticipating future impacts is a challenging task. Experts show 
substantial disagreement about when different advances in AI 
capabilities should be expected [10], [11]. Policy-makers face challenges 
in keeping pace with technological progress: it is difficult to foresee 
impacts before a technology is deployed, but after deployment it may 
already be too late to shape impacts, and some harm may already have 
been done [12]. Ideally, we would focus preventative, anticipatory 
efforts on applications which are close enough to deployment to be 
meaningfully influenced today, but whose impacts we are not already 
seeing. Finding ‘early warning signs’ of transformative AI applications 
can help us to do this.
Early warning signs can also help democratise AI development and 
governance. They can provide time and direction for much-needed 
public discourse about what we want and do not want from AI. It is 
not enough for anticipatory governance to look out for supposedly 
‘inevitable’ future impacts. We are not mere bystanders in this AI 
revolution: the futures we occupy will be futures of our own making, 
driven by the actions of technology developers, policymakers, civil 
society and the public. In order to prevent foreseeable harms towards 
those people who bear the effects of AI deployments, we must find 
ways for AI developers to be held accountable to the society which they 
are embedded in. If we want AI to benefit society broadly, we must 
urgently find ways to give democratic control to those who will be 
impacted.  Our aim with identifying early warning signs is to develop 
anticipatory methods which can prompt a focussed civic discourse 
around significant developments and provide a wider range of people 
with the information they need to contribute to conversations about 
the future of AI.
We present a methodology for identifying early warning signs of 
potentially transformative impacts of AI and discuss how these can 
feed into more anticipatory and democratic governance processes. 
We call these early warning signs ‘canaries’ based on the practice of 
using canaries to provide early warnings of unsafe air pollution in coal 
mines in the industrial revolution. Others before us have used this 
term in the context of AI to stress the importance of early warning 
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signs [13], [14], but this is the first attempt to outline in detail how 
such ‘artificial canaries’ might be identified and used.
Our methodology is a prototype but we believe it provides 
an important first step towards assessing and then trialling the 
feasibility of identifying canaries. We first present the approach and 
then illustrate it on two high-level examples, in which we identify 
preliminary warning signs of AI applications that could undermine 
democracy, and warning signs of progress towards high-level machine 
intelligence (HLMI). We explain why early warning signs are needed 
by drawing on the literature of participatory technology assessments, 
and we discuss the advantages and practical challenges of this method 
in the hope of preparing future research that might attempt to put 
this method into practise. Our theoretical exploration of a method to 
identify early warning signs of transformative applications provides 
a foundation towards more anticipatory, accountable and democratic 
governance of AI in practice.
II. Related Work
We rely on two main bodies of work. Our methodology for 
identifying canaries relies on the literature on forecasting and 
monitoring AI. Our suggestions for how canaries might be 
used once identified build on work on participatory technology 
assessments, which stresses a more inclusive approach to 
technology governance. While substantial research exists in both 
these areas, we believe this is the first piece of work that shows 
how they could feed into each other.
A. AI Forecasting and Monitoring
Over the past decade, an increasing number of studies have 
attempted to forecast AI progress. They commonly use expert 
elicitations to generate probabilistic estimates for when different AI 
advances and milestones will be achieved [10], [15]–[17]. For example, 
[16] ask experts about when specific milestones in AI will be achieved, 
including passing the Turing Test or passing third grade. Both [15] and 
[10] ask experts to predict the arrival of high-level machine intelligence 
(HLMI), which the latter define as when “unaided machines can 
accomplish every task better and more cheaply than human workers”. 
However, we should be cautious about giving results from these 
surveys too much weight. These studies have several limitations, 
including the fact that the questions asked are often ambiguous, that 
expertise is narrowly defined, and that respondents do not receive 
training in quantitative forecasting [11], [18]. Experts disagree 
substantially about when crucial capabilities will be achieved [10], but 
these surveys cannot tell us who (if anyone) is more accurate in their 
predictions.
Issues of accuracy and reliability aside, forecasts focused solely on 
timelines for specific events are limited in how much they can inform 
our decisions about AI today. While it is interesting to know how 
much experts disagree on AI progress via these probabilistic estimates, 
they cannot tell us why experts disagree or what would change their 
minds. Surveys tell us little about what early warning signs to look 
out for or where we should place our focus today to shape the future 
development and impact of AI. 
At the same time, several projects, e.g. [19]–[22], have begun to 
track and measure progress in AI. These projects focus on a range of 
indicators relevant to AI progress, but do not make any systematic 
attempt to identify which markers of progress are more important 
than others for the preparation of transformative applications. Time 
and attention for tracking progress is limited and it would be helpful 
if we were able to prioritise and monitor those research areas that are 
most relevant to mitigating risks.
Recognising some of the limitations of existing work, [23] aims 
for a more holistic approach to AI forecasting. This framework 
emphasises the use of the Delphi technique [24] to aggregate different 
perspectives of a group of experts, and cognitive mapping methods 
to study how different milestones relate to one another, rather 
than to simply forecast milestones in isolation. We agree that such 
methods might address some limitations of previous work in both AI 
forecasting and monitoring. AI forecasting has focused on timelines 
for particularly extreme events, but these timelines are subject 
to enormous uncertainty and do not indicate near-term warning 
signs. AI measurement initiatives have the opposite limitation: they 
focus on near-term progress, but with little systematic reflection on 
which avenues of progress are, from a governance perspective, more 
important to monitor than others. What is needed are attempts to 
identify areas of progress today that may be particularly important to 
pay attention to, given concerns about the kinds of transformative AI 
systems that may be possible in future. 
B. Participatory Technology Assessments
Presently, the impacts of AI are largely shaped by a small group of 
powerful people with a narrow perspective which can be at odds with 
public interest [25]. Only a few powerful actors, such as governments, 
defence agencies, and firms the size of Google or Amazon, have the 
resources to conduct ambitious research projects. Democratic control 
over these research projects is limited. Governments retain discretion 
over what gets regulated, large technology firms can distort and avoid 
policies via intensive lobbying [26] and defence agencies may classify 
ongoing research. 
Recognising these problems, a number of initiatives over the past 
few years have emphasised the need for wider participation in the 
development and governance of AI [27]–[29]. In considering how 
best to achieve this, it is helpful to look to the field of science and 
technology studies (STS) which has long considered the value of 
democratising research progress [30], [31]. Several publications refer 
to the ‘participatory turn’ [32] in STS and an increasing interest in 
the role of the non-expert in technology development and assessment 
[27]. More recently, in the spirit of “democratic experimentation” 
[33], various methods for civic participation have been developed 
and trialled, including deliberative polls, citizen juries and scenario 
exercises [33]. 
With a widening conception of expertise, a large body of research on 
“participatory technology assessment” (PTA) has emerged, aiming to 
examine how we might increase civic participation in how technology 
is developed, assessed and rolled out. We cannot summarise this wide-
ranging and complex body of work fully here. But we point towards 
some relevant pieces for interested readers to begin with. [34] and 
[35] present a typology of the methods and goals of participating, 
which now come in many forms. This means that assessments of the 
success of PTAs are challenging [33] and ongoing because different 
studies evaluate different PTA processes against different goals [34]. 
Yet while scholars recognise remaining limitations of PTAs [31], 
several arguments for their advantages have been brought forward, 
ranging from citizen agency to consensus identification and justice. 
There are good reasons to believe that non-experts possess relevant 
end-user expertise. They often quickly develop the relevant subject-
matter understanding to contribute meaningfully, leading to better 
epistemic outcomes due to a greater diversity of views which result in 
a cancellation of errors [36], [37]. To assess the performance of PTAs 
scholars draw from case studies and identify best practices [38]–[40].
There is an important difference between truly participatory, 
democratically minded, technology assessments, and consultations that 
use the public to help legitimise a preconceived technology [41]. The 
question of how to make PTAs count in established representational 
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democracies is an ongoing challenge to the field [31], [33]. But [42], 
who present a recent example of collective technology policy-making, 
show that success and impact with PTAs is possible. [40] draw from 
38 international case studies to extract best practices, building on [38], 
who showcase great diversity of possible ways in which to draw on the 
public. Comparing different approaches is difficult, but has been done 
[39], [43]. [41] present a conceptual framework with which to design 
and assess PTAs, [44] compares online versus offline methodologies 
and in [35] we find a typology of various design choices for public 
engagement mechanisms. See also [45] for a helpful discussion on 
how to determine the diversity of participants, [46] on what counts as 
expertise in foresight and [30], [32], [47] for challenges to be aware of 
in implementing PTAs.
Many before us have noted that we need wider participation in the 
development and governance of AI, including by calling for the use of 
PTAs in designing algorithms [48], [49]. We see a need to go beyond 
greater participation in addressing existing problems with algorithms 
and propose that wider participation should also be considered in 
conversations about future AI impacts.
Experts and citizens each have a role to play in ensuring that AI 
governance is informed by and inclusive of a wide range of knowledge, 
concerns and perspectives. However, the question of how best to 
marry expert foresight and citizen engagement is a challenging one. 
While a full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper, 
what we do offer is a first step: a proposal for how expert elicitation 
can be used to identify important warnings which can later be used 
to facilitate timely democratic debate. For such debates to be useful, 
we first need an idea of which developments on the horizon can be 
meaningfully assessed and influenced, for which it makes sense to 
draw on public expertise and limited attention. This is precisely what 
our method aims to provide.
III. Identifying Early Warning Signs
We believe that identifying canaries for transformative AI is 
a tractable problem and worth investing research effort in today. 
Engineering and cognitive development present a proof of principle: 
capabilities are achieved sequentially, meaning that there are often key 
underlying capabilities which, if attained, unlock progress in many 
other areas. For example, musical protolanguage is thought to have 
enabled grammatical competence in the development of language in 
homo sapiens [50]. AI progress so far has also seen such amplifiers: the 
use of multi-layered non-linear learning or stochastic gradient descent 
arguably laid the foundation for unexpectedly fast progress on image 
recognition, translation and speech recognition [51]. By mapping out 
the dependencies between different capabilities needed to reach some 
notion of transformative AI, therefore, we should be able to identify 
milestones which are particularly important for enabling many others 
- these are our canaries. 
The proposed methodology is intended to be highly adaptable and 
can be used to identify canaries for a number of important potentially 
transformative events, such as foundational research breakthroughs 
or the automation of tasks that affect a wide range of jobs. Many types 
of indicators could be of interest and classed as canaries, including: 
algorithmic innovation that supports key cognitive faculties (e.g., 
natural language understanding); overcoming known technical 
challenges (such as improving the data efficiency of deep learning 
algorithms); or improved applicability of AI to economically-relevant 
tasks (e.g. text summarization). 
Given an event for which we wish to identify canaries, our 
methodology has three essential steps: (1) identifying key milestones 
towards the event; (2) identifying dependency relations between these 
milestones; and (3) identifying milestones which underpin many 
others as canaries. See Fig. 1 for an illustration. We here deliberately 
refrain from describing the method with too much specificity, because 
we want to stress the flexibility of our approach, and recognise that 
there is currently no one-fits-all approach in forecasting. The method 
will require adaptation to the particular transformative event in 
question, but each step of this method is suited for such specifications. 
We outline example adaptations of the method to particular cases.
There is an urgent need to develop anticipatory governance approaches to AI development and deployment. As AI advances, its impacts on society will become more profound, and some harms may be too great to rely on purely ‘reactive’ or retrospective governance.
Anticipating future impacts is a challenging task. Experts show substantial disagreement about when dierent advances in AI capabilities should be expected [10], [11]. Policy-makers face challenges in keeping pace with technological progress: it is dicult to foresee impacts before a technology is deployed, but after deployment it may already be too late to shape impacts, and some harm may already have been done [12]. Ideally, we would focus preventative, anticipatory eorts on applications which are close enough to deployment to be meaningfully inuenced today, but whose impacts we are not already seeing. Finding ‘early warning signs’ of transformative AI applications can help us to do this.
Early warning signs can also help democratise AI development and governance. They can provide time and direction for much-needed public discourse about what we want and do not want from AI. It is not enough for anticipatory governance to look out for supposedly ‘inevitable’ future impacts. We are not mere bystanders in this AI revolution: the futures we occupy will be futures of our own making, driven by the actions of technology developers, policymakers, civil society and the public. In order to prevent foreseeable harms towards those people who bear the eects of AI deployments, we must nd ways for AI developers to be held accountable to the society which they are embedded in. If we want AI to benet society broadly, we must urgently nd ways to give democratic control to those who will be impacted.  Our aim with identifying early warning signs is to develop anticipatory methods which can prompt a focussed civic discourse around signicant developments and provide a wider range of people with the information they need to contribute to conversations about the future of AI.
We present a methodology for identifying early warning signs of potentially transformative impacts of AI and discuss how these can feed into more anticipatory and democratic governance processes. We call these early warning signs ‘canaries’ based on the practice of using canaries to provide early warnings of unsafe air pollution in coal mines in the industrial revolution. Others before us have used this term in the context of AI to stress the importance of early warning signs [13], [14], but this is the rst attempt to outline in detail how such ‘articial canaries’ might be identied and used.
Our methodology is a prototype but we believe it provides an important rst step towards assessing and then trialling the feasibility of identifying canaries. We rst present the approach and then illustrate it on two high-level examples, in which we identify preliminary warning signs of AI applications that could undermine democracy, and warning signs of progress towards high-level machine intelligence (HLMI). We explain why early warning signs are needed by drawing on the literature of participatory technology assessments, and we discuss the advantages and practical challenges of this method in the hope of preparing future research that might attempt to put this method into practise. Our theoretical exploration of a method to identify early warning signs of transformative applications provides a foundation towards more anticipatory, accountable and democratic governance of AI in practice. 
Related Work
We rely on two main bodies of work. Our methodology for identifying canaries relies on the literature on forecasting and monitoring AI. Our suggestions for how canaries might be used once identied build on work on participatory technology assessments, which stresses a more inclusive approach to technology governance. While substantial research exists in both these areas, we believe this is the rst piece of work that shows how they could feed into each other.
AI forecasting and monitoring
Over the past decade, an increasing number of studies have attempted to forecast AI progress. They commonly use expert elicitations to generate probabilistic estimates for when dierent AI advances and milestones will be achieved [10], [15]–[17]. For example, [16] ask experts about when specic milestones in AI will be achieved, including passing the Turing Test or passing third grade. Both [15] and [10] ask experts to predict the arrival of high-level machine intelligence (HLMI), which the latter dene as when “unaided machines can accomplish every task better and more cheaply than human workers”. 
However, we should be cautious about giving results from these surveys too much weight. These studies have several limitations, including the fact that the questions asked are often ambiguous, that expertise is narrowly dened, and that respondents do not receive training in quantitative forecasting [11], [18]. Experts disagree substantially about when crucial capabilities will be achieved [10], but these surveys cannot tell us who (if anyone) is more accurate in their predictions.
Issues of accuracy and reliability aside, forecasts focused solely on timelines for specic events are limited in how much they can inform our decisions about AI today. While it is interesting to know how much experts disagree on AI progress via these probabilistic estimates, they cannot tell us why experts disagree or what would change their minds. Surveys tell us little about what early warning signs to look out for or where we should place our focus today to shape the future development and impact of AI. 
At the same time, several projects, e.g. [19]–[22], have begun to track and measure progress in AI. These projects focus on a range of indicators relevant to AI progress, but do not make any systematic attempt to identify which markers of progress are more important than others for the preparation of transformative applications. Time and attention for tracking progress is limited and it would be helpful if we were able to prioritise and monitor those research areas that are most relevant to mitigating risks.
Recognising some of the limitations of existing work, [23] aims for a more holistic approach to AI forecasting. This framework emphasises the use of the Delphi technique [24] to aggregate dierent perspectives of a group of experts, and cognitive mapping methods to study how dierent milestones relate to one another, rather than to simply forecast milestones in isolation. We agree that such methods might address some limitations of previous work in both AI forecasting and monitoring. AI forecasting has focused on timelines for particularly extreme events, but these timelines are subject to enormous uncertainty and do not indicate near-term warning signs. AI measurement initiatives have the opposite limitation: they focus on near-term progress, but with little systematic reection on which avenues of progress are, from a governance perspective, more important to monitor than others. What is needed are attempts to identify areas of progress today that may be particularly important to pay attention to, given concerns about the kinds of transformative AI systems that may be possible in future. 
Participatory technology assessments
Presently, the impacts of AI are largely shaped by a small group of powerful people with a narrow perspective which can be at odds with public interest [25]. Only a few powerful actors, such as governments, defence agencies, and rms the size of Google or Amazon, have the resources to conduct ambitious research projects. Democratic control over these research projects is limited. Governments retain discretion over what gets regulated, large technology rms can distort and avoid policies via intensive lobbying [26] and defence agencies may classify ongoing research. 
Recognising these problems, a number of initiatives over the past few years have emphasised the need for wider participation in the development and governance of AI [27]–[29]. In considering how best to achieve this, it is helpful to look to the eld of science and technology studies (STS) which has long considered the value of democratising research progress [30], [31]. Several publications refer to the ‘participatory turn’ [32] in STS and an increasing interest in the role of the non-expert in technology development and assessment [27]. More recently, in the spirit of “democratic experimentation” [33], various methods for civic participation have been developed and trialled, including deliberative polls, citizen juries and scenario exercises [33]. 
With a widening conception of expertise, a large body of research on “participatory technology assessment” (PTA) has emerged, aiming to examine how we might increase civic participation in how technology is developed, assessed and rolled out. We cannot summarise this wide-ranging and complex body of work fully here. But we point towards some relevant pieces for interested readers to begin with. [34] and [35] present a typology of the methods and goals of participating, which now come in many forms. This means that assessments of the success of PTAs are challenging [33] and ongoing because dierent studies evaluate dierent PTA processes against dierent goals [34]. Yet while scholars recognise remaining limitations of PTAs [31], several arguments for their advantages have been brought forward, ranging from citizen agency to consensus identication and justice. There are good reasons to believe that non-experts possess relevant end-user expertise. They often quickly develop the relevant subject-matter understanding to contribute meaningfully, leading to better epistemic outcomes due to a greater diversity of views which result in a cancellation of errors [36], [37]. To assess the performance of PTAs scholars draw from case studies and identify best practices [38]–[40].
There is an important dierence between truly participatory, democratically minded, technology assessments, and consultations that use the public to help legitimise a preconceived technology [41]. The question of how to make PTAs count in established representational democracies is an ongoing challenge to the eld [31], [33]. But [42], who present a recent example of collective technology policy-making, show that success and impact with PTAs is possible. [40] draw from 38 international case studies to extract best practices, building on [38], who showcase great diversity of possible ways in which to draw on the public. Comparing dierent approaches is dicult, but has been done [39], [43]. [41] present a conceptual framework with which to design and assess PTAs, [44] compares online versus oine methodologies and in [35] we nd a typology of various design choices for public engagement mechanisms. See also [45] for a helpful discussion on how to determine the diversity of participants, [46] on what counts as expertise in foresight and [30], [32], [47] for challenges to be aware of in implementing PTAs.
Many before us have noted that we need wider participation in the development and governance of AI, including by calling for the use of PTAs in designing algorithms [48], [49]. We see a need to go beyond greater participation in addressing existing problems with algorithms and propose that wider participation should also be considered in conversations about future AI impacts.
Experts and citizens each have a role to play in ensuring that AI governance is informed by and inclusive of a wide range of knowledge, concerns and perspectives. However, the question of how best to marry expert foresight and citizen engagement is a challenging one. While a full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper, what we do oer is a rst step: a proposal for how expert elicitation can be used to identify important warnings which can later be used to facilitate timely democratic debate. For such debates to be useful, we rst need an idea of which developments on the horizon can be meaningfully assessed and inuenced, for which it makes sense to draw on public expertise and limited attention. This is precisely what our method aims to provide.
Identifying Early Warning Signs
We believe that identifying canaries for transformative AI is a tractable problem and worth investing research eort in today. Engineering and cognitive development present a proof of principle: capabilities are achieved sequentially, meaning that there are often key underlying capabilities which, if attained, unlock progress in many other areas. For example, musical protolanguage is thought to have enabled grammatical competence in the development of language in homo sapiens [50]. AI progress so far has also seen such ampliers: the use of multi-layered non-linear learning or stochastic gradient descent arguably laid the foundation for unexpectedly fast progress on image recognition, translation and speech recognition [51]. By mapping out the dependencies between dierent capabilities needed to reach some notion of transformative AI, therefore, we should be able to identify milestones which are particularly important for enabling many others - these are our canaries. 
The proposed methodology is intended to be highly adaptable and can be used to identify canaries for a number of important potentially transformative events, such as foundational research breakthroughs or the automation of tasks that aect a wide range of jobs. Many types of indicators could be of interest and classed as canaries, including: algorithmic innovation that supports key cognitive faculties (e.g., natural language understanding); overcoming known technical challenges (such as improving the data eciency of deep learning algorithms); or improved applicability of AI to economically-relevant tasks (e.g. text summarization). 
Given an event for which we wish to identify canaries, our methodology has three essential steps: (1) identifying key milestones towards the event; (2) identifying dependency relations between these milestones; and (3) identifying milestones which underpin many others as canaries. See Fig. 1 for an illustration. We here deliberately refrain from describing the method with too much specicity, because we want to stress the exibility of our approach, and recognise that there is currently no one-ts-all approach in forecasting. The method will require adaptation to the particular transformative event in question, but each step of this method is suited for such specications. We outline example adaptations of the method to particular cases.
Fig. 1.  Illustration of methodological steps to identify canaries of AI progress. 
Identifying milestones via expert elicitation
The rst step of our methodology involves using traditional approaches in expert elicitation to identify milestones that may be relevant to the transformative event in question. Which experts are selected is crucial to the outcome and reliability of studies in AI forecasting. There are unavoidable limitations of using any form of subjective judgement in forecasting, but these limitations can be minimised by carefully thinking through the group selection. Both the direct expertise of individuals, and how they contribute to the diversity of the overall group, must be considered. See [46] for a discussion of who counts as an expert in forecasting. 
Researchers should decide in advance what kinds of expertise are most relevant and must be combined to study the milestones that relate to the transformative event. Milestones might include technical limitations of current methods (e.g. adversarial attacks) and informed speculation about future capabilities (e.g. common sense) that may be important prerequisites to the transformative event. Consulting across a wide range of academic disciplines to order such diverse milestones is important. For example, a cohort of experts identifying and ordering milestones towards HLMI should include not only experts in machine learning and computer science but also cognitive scientists, philosophers, developmental psychologists, evolutionary biologists, or animal cognition experts. Such a group combines expertise on current capabilities in AI, with expertise on key pillars of cognitive development and the order in which cognitive faculties develop in animals. Groups which are diverse (on multiple dimensions) are expected to produce better epistemic outcomes [37], [52]. 
We encourage the careful design and phrasing of questions to enable participants to make use of their expertise, but refrain from demanding answers that lie outside their area of expertise. For example, asking machine learning researchers directly for milestones towards HLMI does not draw on their expertise. But asking machine learning researchers about the limitations of the methods they use every day; or asking psychologists what human capacities they see lacking in machines today, draws directly on their day-to-day experience. Perceived limitations can be then be transformed into milestones.
There are several dierent methods available for expert elicitation including surveys, interviews, workshops and focus groups, each with advantages and disadvantages. Interviews provide greater opportunity to tailor questions to the specic expert, but can be time-intensive compared to surveys and reduce the sample size of experts. If possible, some combination of the two may be ideal: using carefully selected semi-structured interviews to elicit initial milestones, followed-up with surveys with a much broader group to validate which milestones are widely accepted as being key.
Mapping causal relations between milestones
The second step of our methodology involves convening experts to identify causal relations between identied milestones: that is, how milestones may underpin, depend on, or aect progress towards other milestones. Experts should be guided in generating directed causal graphs, a type of cognitive map that elicits a person’s perceived causal relations between components. Causal graphs use arrows to represent perceived causal relations between nodes, which in this case are milestones [53]. 
This process primarily focuses on nding out whether or not a relationship exists at all; how precisely this relationship is specied can be adapted to the goals of the study. An arrow from A to B at minimum indicates that progress on A will allow for further progress on B. But this relationship can also be made more precise: in some cases indicating that progress on AI is necessary for progress on B, for example. The relationship between nodes may be either linear or non-linear; again this can be specied more precisely if needed or known. 
Constructing and debating causal graphs can “help groups to convert tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge” [53]. Causal graphs are used as decision support for individuals or groups, and are often used to solve problems in policy and management involving complex relationships between components in a system by tapping into experts’ mental models and intuitions. We therefore suggest that causal graphs are particularly well-suited to eliciting experts’ models and assumptions about the relationship between dierent milestones in AI development.
As a method, causal graphs are highly exible and can be adapted to the preferred level of detail for a given study: they can be varied in complexity and can be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively [54], [55]. We neither exclude nor favour quantitative approaches here, due to the complexity and uncertainty of the questions around transformative events. Particularly for very high-level questions, quantitative approaches might not oer much advantage and might communicate a false sense of certainty. In narrower domains where there is more existing evidence, however, quantitative approaches may help to represent dierences in the strength of relationships between milestones.
[56] notes that there are no ready-made designs that will t all studies: design and analysis of causal mapping procedures must be matched to a clear theoretical context and the goal of the study. We highlight a number of dierent design choices which can be used to adapt the process. As more studies use causal graphs in expert elicitations about AI developments, we can learn from the success of dierent design choices over time and identify best practices.
[53] stress that interviews or collective brainstorming are the most accepted method for generating the data upon which to analyse causal relations. [57] list heuristics on how to manage the procedure of combining graphs by dierent participants, or see [58] for a discussion on evaluating dierent options presented by experts. [59] suggest visual, interactive tools to aid the process. [56] and [60] discuss approaches to analysing graphs and extracting the emergent properties, signicant ‘core’ nodes as well as hierarchical clusters. Core or “potent” nodes are those that relate to many clusters in the graphs and thus have implications for connected nodes. In our proposed methodology, such potent nodes play a central role in pointing to canary milestones. For more detail on the many options on how to generate, analyse and use causal graphs we refer the reader to the volume of [57], or reviews such as [53], [59]. See [55] for an example of applying cognitive mapping to expert views on UK public policies; and [61] for group problem solving with causal graphs. 
We propose that identied experts be given instruction in generating either an individual causal graph, after which a mediated discussion between experts generates a shared graph; or that the groups of experts as a whole generates the causal graph via argumentation, visualisations and voting procedures if necessary. As [62] emphasises, any group of experts will have both shared and conicting assumptions, which causal graphs aim to integrate in a way that approaches greater accuracy than that contained in any single expert viewpoint. The researchers are free to add as much detail to the nal maps as required or desired. Each node can be broken into subcomponents or justied with extensive literature reviews. 
Identifying canaries
Finally, the resulting causal graphs can be used to identify nodes of particular relevance for progress towards the transformative event in question. This can be a node with a high number of outgoing arrows, i.e. milestones which unlock many others that are prerequisites for the event in question. It can also be a node which functions as a bottleneck - a single dependency node that restricts access to a subsequent highly signicant milestone. See Fig. 2 for an illustration. Progress on these milestones can thus represent a ‘canary’, indicating that further advances in subsequent milestones will become possible and more likely. These canaries can act as early warning signs for potentially rapid and discontinuous progress, or may signal that applications are becoming ready for deployment.  Experts identify nodes which unlock or provide a bottleneck for a signicant number of other nodes (some amount of discretion from the experts/conveners will be needed to determine what counts as ‘signicant’). 
Of course, in some cases generating these causal graphs and using them to identify canaries may be as complicated as a full scientic research project. The diculty of estimating causal relationships between future technological advances must not be underestimated. However, we believe it to be the case that each individual researcher already does this to some extent, when they chose to prioritise a research project, idea or method over another within a research paradigm. Scientists also debate the most fruitful and promising research avenues and arguably place bets on implicit maps of milestones as they pick a research agenda. The idea is not to generate maps that provide a perfectly accurate indication of warning signs, but to use the wisdom of crowds to make implicit assumptions explicit, creating the best possible estimate of which milestones may provide important indications of future transformative progress.
Using Early Warning Signs
Once identied, canary milestones can immediately help to focus existing eorts in forecasting and anticipatory governance. Given limited resources, early warning signs can direct governance attention to areas of AI progress which are soon likely to impact society and which can be inuenced now. For example, if progress in a specic area of NLP (e.g. sentiment analysis) serves as a warning sign for the deployment of more engaging social bots to manipulate voters, policymakers and regulators can monitor or regulate access and research on this research area within NLP. 
We can also establish research and policy initiatives to monitor and forecast progress towards canaries. Initiatives might automate the collection, tracking and agging of new publications relevant to canary capabilities, and build a database of relevant publications. They might use prediction platforms to enable collective forecasting of progress towards canary capabilities. Foundational research can try to validate hypothesised relationships between milestones or illuminate the societal implications of dierent milestones.
These forecasting and tracking initiatives can be used to improve policy prioritisation more broadly. For example, if we begin to see substantial progress in an area of AI likely to impact jobs in a particular domain, policymakers can begin preparing for potential unemployment in that sector with greater urgency.
However, we believe the value of early warning signs can go further and support us in democratising the development and deployment of AI. Providing opportunities for participation and control over policy is a fundamental part of living in a democratic society. It may be especially important in the case of AI, since its deployment might indeed transform society across many sectors. If AI applications are to bring benets across such wide-ranging contexts, AI deployment strategies must consider and be directed by the diverse interests found across those sectors. Interests which are underrepresented at technology rms are otherwise likely to bear the negative impacts.
There is currently an information asymmetry between those developing AI and those impacted by it. Citizens need better information about specic developments and impacts which might aect them. Public attention and funding for deliberation processes is not unlimited, so we need to think carefully about which technologies to direct public attention and funding towards. Identifying early warning signs can help address this issue, by focusing the attention of public debate and directing funding towards deliberation practises that centre around technological advancements on the horizon.
We believe early warning signs may be particularly well-suited to feed into participatory technology assessments (PTAs), as introduced earlier. Early warning signs can provide a concrete focal point for citizens and domain experts to collectively discuss concerns. Having identied a specic warning sign, various PTA formats could be suited to consult citizens who are especially likely to be impacted. PTAs come in many forms and a full analysis of which design is best suited to assessing particular AI applications is beyond the scope of this article. But the options are plenty and PTAs show much potential (see section 2). For example, Taiwan has had remarkable success and engagement with an open consultation of citizens on complex technology policy questions [42]. An impact assessment of PTA is not a simple task, but we hypothesise that carefully designed, inclusive PTAs would present a great improvement over how AI is currently developed, deployed and governed. Our suggestion is not limited to governmental bodies. PTAs or other deliberative processes can be run by research groups and private institutions such as AI labs, technology companies and think tanks who are concerned with ensuring AI benets all of humanity.
Method illustrations
We outline two examples of how this methodology could be adapted and implemented: one focused on identifying warning signs of a particular societal impact, the other on warning signs of progress towards particular technical capabilities. Both these examples pertain to high-level, complex questions about the future development and impacts of AI, meaning our discussion can only begin to illustrate what the process of identifying canaries would look like, and what questions such a process might raise. Since the results are only the suggestions of the authors of this paper, we do not show a full implementation of the method whose value lies in letting a group of experts deliberate. As mentioned previously, the work of generating these causal maps will often be a research project of its own, and we will return later to the question of what level of detail and certainty is needed to make the resulting graphs useful.
First illustration: AI applications in voter manipulation
We show how our method could identify warning signs of the kind of algorithmic progress which could improve the eectiveness of, or reduce the cost of, algorithmic election manipulation. The use of algorithms in attempts to manipulate election results incur great risk for the epistemic resilience of democratic countries [63]–[65]. 
Manipulations of public opinion by national and commercial actors are not a new phenomenon. [66] details the history of how newly emerging technologies are often used for this purpose. But recent advances in deep learning techniques, as well as the widespread use of social media, have introduced easy and more eective mechanisms for inuencing opinions and behaviour. [8] and [67] detail the various ways in which political and commercial actors incur harm to the information ecosystem via the use of algorithms. Manipulators prole voters to identify susceptible targets on social media, distribute micro-targeted advertising, spread misinformation about policies of the opposing candidate and try to convince unwanted voters not to vote. Automation plays a large role in inuencing online public discourse. Publications like [68], [69] note that manipulators use both human-run accounts and bots [70] or a combination of the two [71]. Misinformation [72] and targeted messaging [73] can have transformative implications for the resilience of democracies and very possibility of collective action [74], [75].
Despite attempts by national and sub-national actors to apply algorithms to inuence elections, their impact so far has been contested [76]. Yet, foreign actors and national political campaigns will continue to have incentives and substantial resources to invest in such campaigns, suggesting their eorts are unlikely to wane in future. We may thus inquire what kinds of technological progress would increase the risk that elections can be successfully manipulated. We can begin this inquiry by identifying what technological barriers currently prevent full-scale election manipulation.
We would identify those technological limitations by drawing on the expertise of actors who are directly aected by these bottlenecks. Those might be managers of online political campaigns and foreign consulting rms (as described in [8]), who specialise in inuencing public opinion via social media, or governmental organisations across the world who comment on posts, target individual inuencers and operate fake accounts to uphold and spread particular beliefs. People who run such political cyber campaigns have knowledge of what technological bottlenecks still constrain their inuence on voter decisions. We recommend running a series of interviews to collect a list of limitations. 
This list might include, for example, that the natural language functionality of social bots is a major bottleneck for eective online inuence (for the plausibility of this being an important technical factor see [8]). Targeted users often disengage from a chat conversation after detecting that they are exchanging messages with social bots. Low retention time is presumably a bottleneck for further manipulation, which suggests that improvements in natural language processing (NLP) would signicantly reduce the cost of manipulation as social bots become more eective. 
We will assume, for the purpose of this illustration that NLP were to be identied as a key bottleneck. We would then seek to gather experts (e.g. in a workshop) who can identify and map milestones (or current limitations) in NLP likely to be relevant to improving the functionality of social bots. This will include machine learning experts who specialise in NLP and understand the technical barriers to developing more convincing social bots; as well as experts in developmental linguistics and evolutionary biology, who can determine suitable benchmarks and the required skills, and who understand the order in which linguistic skills are usually developed in animals. 
From these expert elicitation processes we would acquire a list of milestones in NLP which, if achieved, would likely lower the cost and increase the eectiveness of online manipulation. Experts would then order milestones into a causal graph of dependencies. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the question at hand, we suggest in this case that the graph should be directly developed by the whole group. A mediated discussion in a workshop context can help to draw out dierent connections between milestones and the reasoning behind them, ensuring participants do not make judgements outside their range of expertise. A voting procedure such as majority voting should be used if no consensus can be reached. In a nal step, experts can highlight milestone nodes in the nal graph which are either marked by many outgoing nodes or are bottlenecks for a series of subsequent nodes that are not accessed by an alternative pathway. These (e.g. sentiment analysis) are our canaries: areas of progress which serve as a warning sign of NLP being applied more eectively in voter manipulation. 
Having looked at how this methodology can be used to identify warning signs of a specic societal impact, we next illustrate a dierent application of the method in which we aim to identify warning signs of a research breakthrough.
Second illustration: high-level machine intelligence
We use this second example to illustrate in more detail what the process of developing a causal map might look like once initial milestones have been identied, and how canary capabilities can be identied from the map.
We dene high-level machine intelligence (HLMI) as an AI system (or collection of AI systems) that performs at the level of an average human adult on key cognitive measures required for economically relevant tasks. We choose to focus on HLMI since it is a milestone which has been the focus of previous forecasting studies [10], [15], and which, despite the ambiguity and uncertain nature of the concepts, is interesting to attempt to examine, because it is likely to precipitate widely transformative societal impacts. 
To trial this method, we used interview results from [11]. 25 experts from a diverse set of disciplines (including computer science, cognitive science and neuroscience) were interviewed and asked what they believed to be the main limitations preventing current machine learning methods from achieving the capabilities of HLMI. These limitations can be translated into ‘milestones’: capabilities experts believe machine learning methods need to achieve on the path to HLMI, i.e. the output of step 1 of our methodology. 
Having identied key milestones, step 2 of our methodology involves exploring dependencies between them using causal graphs. We use the software VenSim to illustrate hypothesised relationships between milestones (see Fig. 2). For example, we hypothesise that the ability to formulate, comprehend and manipulate abstract concepts may be an important prerequisite to the ability to account for unobservable phenomena, which is in turn important for reasoning about causality. This map of causal relations and dependencies was constructed by the authors alone, and is therefore far from denitive, but provides a useful illustration of the kind of output this methodology can produce.
Fig. 2. Cognitive map of dependencies between milestones collected in expert elicitations. Arrows coloured in green signify those milestones that have most outgoing arrows. See appendix for description of each milestone and dependency relations between one ‘canary’ node and subsequent nodes.
Based on this causal map, we can identify three candidates for canary capabilities:
Representations that allow variable-binding and disentanglement: the ability to construct abstract, discrete and disentangled representations of inputs, to allow for eciency and variable-binding. We hypothesise that this capability underpins several others, including grammar, mathematical reasoning, concept formation, and exible memory.
Flexible memory: the ability to store, recognise, and re-use memory and knowledge representations. We hypothesise that this ability would unlock many others, including the ability to learn from dynamic data, to learn in a continual fashion, and to update old interpretations of data as new information is acquired. 
Positing unobservables: the ability to recognise and use unobservable concepts that are not represented in the visual features of a scene, including numerosity or intentionality. 
We might tentatively suggest that these are important capabilities to track progress on from the perspective of anticipating HLMI. 
Discussion and Future Directions
As the two illustrative examples show, there are many complexities and challenges involved in putting this method into practice. One particular challenge is that there is likely to be substantial uncertainty in the causal graphs developed. This uncertainty can come in many forms. 
Milestones that are not well understood are likely to be composed of several sub-milestones. As more research is produced, the graph will be in need of revision. Some such revisions may include the addition of connections between milestones that were previously not foreseen, which in turn might alter the number of outgoing connections from nodes and turn them into potent nodes, i.e. ‘canaries’.
The process of involving a diversity of experts in a multi-stage, collaborative process is designed to reduce this uncertainty by allowing for the identication of nodes and relationships that are widely agreed upon and so more likely to be robust. However, considerable uncertainty will inevitably remain due to the nature of forecasting. The higher the level of abstraction and ambiguity in the events studied (like events such as HLMI, which we use for our illustration) the greater the uncertainty inherent in the map and the less reliable the forecasts will likely be. It will be important to nd ways to acknowledge and represent this uncertainty in the maps developed and conclusions drawn from them. This might include marking uncertainties in the graph and taking this into account when identifying and communicating ‘canary’ nodes. 
Given the uncertainty inherent in forecasting, we must consider what kinds of inevitable misjudgements are most important to try to avoid. A precautionary perspective would suggest it is better to slightly overspend resources on monitoring canaries that turn out to be false positives, rather than to miss an opportunity to anticipate signicant technological impacts. This suggests we may want to set a low threshold for what should be considered a ‘canary’ in the nal stage of the method.
The uncertainty raises an important question: will it on average be better to have an imperfect, uncertain mapping of milestones rather than none at all? There is some chance that incorrect estimates of ‘canaries’ could be harmful. An incorrect mapping could focus undue attention on some avenue of AI progress, waste resources or distract from more important issues. 
Our view is that it is nonetheless preferable to attempt a prioritisation. The realistic alternative is that anticipatory governance is not attempted or informed by scholars’ individual estimates in an ad-hoc manner, which we should expect to be incorrect more often than our collective and structured expert elicitation. How accurate our method is can only be studied by trialling it and tracking its predictions as AI research progresses to conrm or refute the forecasts. 
Future studies are likely to face several trade-os in managing the uncertainty. For example, a large and cognitively diverse expert group may be better placed to develop robust maps eventually, but this may be a much more challenging process than doing it with a smaller, less diverse group -- making the latter a tempting choice (see [45] for a discussion of this trade-o). The study of broad and high-level questions (such as when we might attain HLMI or automate a large percentage of jobs) may be more societally relevant or intellectually motivating, but narrower studies focused on nearer-term, well-dened applications or impacts may be easier to reach certainty on. 
A further risk is that this method, intended to identify warning signs so as to give time to debate transformative applications, may inadvertently speed up progress towards AI capabilities and applications. By fostering expert deliberation and mapping milestones, it is likely that important research projects and goals are highlighted and the eld’s research roadmap is improved. This means our method must be used with caution. 
However, we do not believe this is a reason to abandon the approach, since these concerns must be balanced against the benets of being able to deliberate upon and shape the impacts of AI in advance. In particular, we believe that the process of distilling information from experts in a way that can be communicated to wider society, including those currently underrepresented in debates about the future of AI, is likely to have many more benets than costs.
The idea that we can identify ‘warning signs’ for progress assumes that there will be some time lag between progress on milestones, during which anticipatory governance work can take place. Of course, the extent to which this is possible will vary, and in some cases, unlocking a ‘canary’ capability could lead to very rapid progress on subsequent milestones. Future work could consider how to incorporate assessment of timescales into the causal graphs developed, so that it is easier to identify canaries which warn of future progress while allowing time to prepare.
Future work should also critically consider what constitutes relevant ‘expertise’ for the task of identifying canaries, and further explore ways to eectively integrate expert knowledge with the values and perspectives of diverse publics. Our method nds a role for the expert situated in a larger democratic process of anticipating and regulating emerging technologies.  Expert judgement can thereby be benecial to wider participation. However, processes that allow more interaction between experts and citizens could be even more eective. One limitation of the method presented in this paper is that it requires one to have already identied a particular transformative event of concern, but does not provide guidance on how to identify and prioritise between events. It may be valuable to consider how citizens that are impacted by technology can play a role in identifying initial areas of concern, which can then feed into this process of expert elicitation to address the concerns.
Conclusion
We have presented a exible method for identifying early warning signs, or ‘canaries’ in AI progress. Once identied, these canaries can provide focal points for anticipatory governance eorts, and can form the basis for meaningful participatory processes enabling citizens to steer AI developments and their impacts. Future work must now test this method by putting it into practice, which will more clearly reveal both benets and limitations. Our articial canaries oer a chance for forward-looking, democratic assessments of transformative technologies. 
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Appendix
Table I. Limitations of deep learning as perceived and named by experts found in [11]
Causal reasoning: the ability to detect and generalise from causal relations in data. Common sense: having a set of background beliefs or assumptions which are useful across domains and tasks.
Meta-learning: the ability to learn how to best learn in each domain. Architecture search: the ability to automatically choose the best architecture of a neural network for a task.
Hierarchical decomposition: the ability to decompose tasks and objects into smaller and hierarchical sub-components. Cross-domain generalization: the ability to apply learning from one task or domain to another.
Representation: the ability to learn abstract representations of the environment for ecient learning and generalisation. Variable binding: the ability to attach symbols to learned representations, enabling generalisation and re-use.
Disentanglement: the ability to understand the components and composition of observations, and recombine and recognise them in dierent contexts. Analogical reasoning: the ability to detect abstract similarity across domains, enabling learning and generalisation.
Concept formation: the ability to formulate, manipulate and comprehend abstract concepts. Object permanence: the ability to represent objects as consistently existing even when out of sight.
Grammar: the ability to construct and decompose sentences according to correct grammatical rules. Reading comprehension: the ability to detect narratives, semantic context, themes and relations between characters in long texts or stories.
Mathematical reasoning: the ability to develop, identify and search mathematical proofs and follow logical deduction in reasoning. Visual question answering: the ability to answer open-ended questions about the content and interpretation of an image.
Uncertainty estimation: the ability to represent and consider dierent types of uncertainty. Positing unobservables: the ability to account for unobservable phenomena, particularly in representing and navigating environments.
Reinterpretation: the ability to partially re-categorise, re-assign or reinterpret data in light of new information without retraining from scratch. Theorising and hypothesising: the ability to propose theories and testable hypotheses, understand the dierence between theory and reality, and the impact of data on theories.
Flexible memory: the ability to store, recognise and retrieve knowledge so that it can be used in new environments and tasks. Ecient learning: the ability to learn eciently from small amounts of data.
Interpretability: the ability for humans to interpret internal network dynamics so that researchers can manipulate network dynamics. Continual learning: the ability to learn continuously as new data is acquired.
Active learning: the ability to learn and explore in self-directed ways. Learning from inaccessible data: the ability to learn in domains where data is missing, dicult or expensive to acquire.
Learning from dynamic data: the ability to learn from a continually changing stream of data. Navigating brittle environments: the ability to navigate irregular, and complex environments which lack clear reward signals and short feedback loops.
Generating valuation functions: the ability to generate new valuation functions immediately from scratch to follow newly-given rules. Scalability: the ability to scale up learning to deal with new features without needing disproportionately more data, model parameters, and computational power.
Learning in simulation: the ability to learn all relevant experience from a simulated environment. Metric identication: the ability to identify appropriate metrics of success for complex tasks, such that optimising for the measured quantity accomplishes the task in the way intended.
Conscious perception: the ability to experience the world from a rst-person perspective. Context-sensitive decision making: the ability to adapt decision-making strategies to the needs and constraints of a given time or context.
It is worth noting there are apparent similarities and relationships between many of these milestones. For example, representation: the ability to learn abstract representations of the environment, seems closely related to variable binding: the ability to formulate place-holder concepts. The ability to apply learning from one task to another, cross-domain generalisation, seems closely related to analogical reasoning. Further progress in research will tell which of these are clearly separate milestones or more closely related notions.
Flexible memory, as described by experts in our sample, is the ability to recognize and store reusable information, in a format that is exible so that it can be retrieved and updated when new knowledge is gained. We explain the reasoning behind the labelled arrows in Fig. 2 (see Fig. 3):
Fig. 3. Extract of Fig. 2, showing one candidate canary capability.
(a): compact representations are a prerequisite for exible memory since storing high-dimensional input in memory requires compressed, ecient and thus abstract representations.
(B): the ability to reinterpret data in light of new information likely requires exible memory, since it requires the ability to retrieve and alter previously stored information. 
(C) and (E): to make use of dynamic and changing data input, and to learn continuously over time, an agent must be able to store, correctly retrieve and modify previous data as new data comes in.
(D): in order to plan and execute strategies in brittle environments with long delays between actions and rewards, an agent must be able to store memories of past actions and rewards, but easily retrieve this information and continually update its best guess about how to obtain rewards in the environment.
(F): analogical reasoning involves comparing abstract representations, which requires forming, recognising, and retrieving representations of earlier observations.
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Fig. 1.  Illustration of methodological steps to identify canaries of AI progress.
A. Identifying Milestones Via Expert Elicitation
The first step of our methodology involves using traditional 
approaches in expert elicitation to identify milestones that may 
be relevant to the transformative event in question. Which experts 
are selected is crucial to the outcome and reliability of studies in AI 
forecasting. There are unavoidable limitations of using any form 
of subjective judgement in forecasting, but these limitations can be 
minimised by carefully thinking through the group selection. Both the 
direct expertise of individuals, and how they contribute to the diversity 
of the overall group, must be considered. See [46] for a discussion of 
who counts as an expert in forecasting. 
Researchers should decide in advance what kinds of expertise are 
most relevant and must be combined to study the milestones that 
relate to the transformative event. Milestones might include technical 
limitations of current methods (e.g. adversarial attacks) and informed 
speculation about future capabilities (e.g. common sense) that may be 
important prerequisites to the transformative event. Consulting across 
a wide range of academic disciplines to order such diverse milestones 
is important. For example, a cohort of experts identifying and 
ordering milestones towards HLMI should include not only experts in 
machine learning and computer science but also cognitive scientists, 
philosophers, developmental psychologists, evolutionary biologists, 
or animal cognition experts. Such a group combines expertise on 
current capabilities in AI, with expertise on key pillars of cognitive 
development and the order in which cognitive faculties develop in 
animals. Groups which are diverse (on multiple dimensions) are 
expected to produce better epistemic outcomes [37], [52]. 
We encourage the careful design and phrasing of questions to 
enable participants to make use of their expertise, but refrain from 
demanding answers that lie outside their area of expertise. For example, 
asking machine learning researchers directly for milestones towards 
HLMI does not draw on their expertise. But asking machine learning 
researchers about the limitations of the methods they use every day; 
or asking psychologists what human capacities they see lacking 
in machines today, draws directly on their day-to-day experience. 
Perceived limitations can be then be transformed into milestones.
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There are several different methods available for expert elicitation 
including surveys, interviews, workshops and focus groups, each with 
advantages and disadvantages. Interviews provide greater opportunity 
to tailor questions to the specific expert, but can be time-intensive 
compared to surveys and reduce the sample size of experts. If possible, 
some combination of the two may be ideal: using carefully selected 
semi-structured interviews to elicit initial milestones, followed-up 
with surveys with a much broader group to validate which milestones 
are widely accepted as being key.
B. Mapping Causal Relations Between Milestones
The second step of our methodology involves convening experts 
to identify causal relations between identified milestones: that is, how 
milestones may underpin, depend on, or affect progress towards other 
milestones. Experts should be guided in generating directed causal 
graphs, a type of cognitive map that elicits a person’s perceived causal 
relations between components. Causal graphs use arrows to represent 
perceived causal relations between nodes, which in this case are 
milestones [53]. 
This process primarily focuses on finding out whether or not a 
relationship exists at all; how precisely this relationship is specified 
can be adapted to the goals of the study. An arrow from A to B at 
minimum indicates that progress on A will allow for further progress 
on B. But this relationship can also be made more precise: in some 
cases indicating that progress on AI is necessary for progress on B, for 
example. The relationship between nodes may be either linear or non-
linear; again this can be specified more precisely if needed or known. 
Constructing and debating causal graphs can “help groups to 
convert tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge” [53]. Causal graphs 
are used as decision support for individuals or groups, and are 
often used to solve problems in policy and management involving 
complex relationships between components in a system by tapping 
into experts’ mental models and intuitions. We therefore suggest that 
causal graphs are particularly well-suited to eliciting experts’ models 
and assumptions about the relationship between different milestones 
in AI development.
As a method, causal graphs are highly flexible and can be adapted 
to the preferred level of detail for a given study: they can be varied in 
complexity and can be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively 
[54], [55]. We neither exclude nor favour quantitative approaches 
here, due to the complexity and uncertainty of the questions around 
transformative events. Particularly for very high-level questions, 
quantitative approaches might not offer much advantage and might 
communicate a false sense of certainty. In narrower domains where 
there is more existing evidence, however, quantitative approaches may 
help to represent differences in the strength of relationships between 
milestones.
[56] notes that there are no ready-made designs that will fit all 
studies: design and analysis of causal mapping procedures must be 
matched to a clear theoretical context and the goal of the study. We 
highlight a number of different design choices which can be used 
to adapt the process. As more studies use causal graphs in expert 
elicitations about AI developments, we can learn from the success of 
different design choices over time and identify best practices.
[53] stress that interviews or collective brainstorming are the 
most accepted method for generating the data upon which to 
analyse causal relations. [57] list heuristics on how to manage the 
procedure of combining graphs by different participants, or see [58] 
for a discussion on evaluating different options presented by experts. 
[59] suggest visual, interactive tools to aid the process. [56] and [60] 
discuss approaches to analysing graphs and extracting the emergent 
properties, significant ‘core’ nodes as well as hierarchical clusters. Core 
or “potent” nodes are those that relate to many clusters in the graphs 
and thus have implications for connected nodes. In our proposed 
methodology, such potent nodes play a central role in pointing to 
canary milestones. For more detail on the many options on how to 
generate, analyse and use causal graphs we refer the reader to the 
volume of [57], or reviews such as [53], [59]. See [55] for an example 
of applying cognitive mapping to expert views on UK public policies; 
and [61] for group problem solving with causal graphs. 
We propose that identified experts be given instruction in 
generating either an individual causal graph, after which a mediated 
discussion between experts generates a shared graph; or that 
the groups of experts as a whole generates the causal graph via 
argumentation, visualisations and voting procedures if necessary. 
As [62] emphasises, any group of experts will have both shared and 
conflicting assumptions, which causal graphs aim to integrate in 
a way that approaches greater accuracy than that contained in any 
single expert viewpoint. The researchers are free to add as much detail 
to the final maps as required or desired. Each node can be broken into 
subcomponents or justified with extensive literature reviews. 
C. Identifying Canaries
Finally, the resulting causal graphs can be used to identify nodes of 
particular relevance for progress towards the transformative event in 
question. This can be a node with a high number of outgoing arrows, 
i.e. milestones which unlock many others that are prerequisites for the 
event in question. It can also be a node which functions as a bottleneck 
- a single dependency node that restricts access to a subsequent highly 
significant milestone. See Fig. 2 for an illustration. Progress on these 
milestones can thus represent a ‘canary’, indicating that further 
advances in subsequent milestones will become possible and more 
likely. These canaries can act as early warning signs for potentially 
rapid and discontinuous progress, or may signal that applications are 
becoming ready for deployment.  Experts identify nodes which unlock 
or provide a bottleneck for a significant number of other nodes (some 
amount of discretion from the experts/conveners will be needed to 
determine what counts as ‘significant’). 
Of course, in some cases generating these causal graphs and using 
them to identify canaries may be as complicated as a full scientific 
research project. The difficulty of estimating causal relationships 
between future technological advances must not be underestimated. 
However, we believe it to be the case that each individual researcher 
already does this to some extent, when they chose to prioritise a 
research project, idea or method over another within a research 
paradigm. Scientists also debate the most fruitful and promising 
research avenues and arguably place bets on implicit maps of 
milestones as they pick a research agenda. The idea is not to generate 
maps that provide a perfectly accurate indication of warning signs, but 
to use the wisdom of crowds to make implicit assumptions explicit, 
creating the best possible estimate of which milestones may provide 
important indications of future transformative progress.
IV. Using Early Warning Signs
Once identified, canary milestones can immediately help to focus 
existing efforts in forecasting and anticipatory governance. Given 
limited resources, early warning signs can direct governance attention 
to areas of AI progress which are soon likely to impact society and 
which can be influenced now. For example, if progress in a specific 
area of NLP (e.g. sentiment analysis) serves as a warning sign for 
the deployment of more engaging social bots to manipulate voters, 
policymakers and regulators can monitor or regulate access and 
research on this research area within NLP. 
We can also establish research and policy initiatives to monitor 
and forecast progress towards canaries. Initiatives might automate 
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the collection, tracking and flagging of new publications relevant 
to canary capabilities, and build a database of relevant publications. 
They might use prediction platforms to enable collective forecasting of 
progress towards canary capabilities. Foundational research can try to 
validate hypothesised relationships between milestones or illuminate 
the societal implications of different milestones.
These forecasting and tracking initiatives can be used to improve 
policy prioritisation more broadly. For example, if we begin to 
see substantial progress in an area of AI likely to impact jobs in a 
particular domain, policymakers can begin preparing for potential 
unemployment in that sector with greater urgency.
However, we believe the value of early warning signs can go further 
and support us in democratising the development and deployment of 
AI. Providing opportunities for participation and control over policy 
is a fundamental part of living in a democratic society. It may be 
especially important in the case of AI, since its deployment might 
indeed transform society across many sectors. If AI applications are 
to bring benefits across such wide-ranging contexts, AI deployment 
strategies must consider and be directed by the diverse interests 
found across those sectors. Interests which are underrepresented at 
technology firms are otherwise likely to bear the negative impacts.
There is currently an information asymmetry between those 
developing AI and those impacted by it. Citizens need better 
information about specific developments and impacts which might 
affect them. Public attention and funding for deliberation processes is 
not unlimited, so we need to think carefully about which technologies 
to direct public attention and funding towards. Identifying early 
warning signs can help address this issue, by focusing the attention 
of public debate and directing funding towards deliberation practises 
that centre around technological advancements on the horizon.
We believe early warning signs may be particularly well-suited to 
feed into participatory technology assessments (PTAs), as introduced 
earlier. Early warning signs can provide a concrete focal point for 
citizens and domain experts to collectively discuss concerns. Having 
identified a specific warning sign, various PTA formats could be suited 
to consult citizens who are especially likely to be impacted. PTAs come 
in many forms and a full analysis of which design is best suited to 
assessing particular AI applications is beyond the scope of this article. 
But the options are plenty and PTAs show much potential (see section 
2). For example, Taiwan has had remarkable success and engagement 
with an open consultation of citizens on complex technology policy 
questions [42]. An impact assessment of PTA is not a simple task, but 
we hypothesise that carefully designed, inclusive PTAs would present 
a great improvement over how AI is currently developed, deployed 
and governed. Our suggestion is not limited to governmental bodies. 
PTAs or other deliberative processes can be run by research groups and 
private institutions such as AI labs, technology companies and think 
tanks who are concerned with ensuring AI benefits all of humanity.
V. Method Illustrations
We outline two examples of how this methodology could be 
adapted and implemented: one focused on identifying warning signs 
of a particular societal impact, the other on warning signs of progress 
towards particular technical capabilities. Both these examples pertain 
to high-level, complex questions about the future development and 
impacts of AI, meaning our discussion can only begin to illustrate what 
the process of identifying canaries would look like, and what questions 
such a process might raise. Since the results are only the suggestions 
of the authors of this paper, we do not show a full implementation of 
the method whose value lies in letting a group of experts deliberate. 
As mentioned previously, the work of generating these causal maps 
will often be a research project of its own, and we will return later to 
the question of what level of detail and certainty is needed to make the 
resulting graphs useful.
A. First Illustration: AI Applications in Voter Manipulation
We show how our method could identify warning signs of the kind 
of algorithmic progress which could improve the effectiveness of, 
or reduce the cost of, algorithmic election manipulation. The use of 
algorithms in attempts to manipulate election results incur great risk 
for the epistemic resilience of democratic countries [63]–[65]. 
Manipulations of public opinion by national and commercial actors 
are not a new phenomenon. [66] details the history of how newly 
emerging technologies are often used for this purpose. But recent 
advances in deep learning techniques, as well as the widespread use 
of social media, have introduced easy and more effective mechanisms 
for influencing opinions and behaviour. [8] and [67] detail the various 
ways in which political and commercial actors incur harm to the 
information ecosystem via the use of algorithms. Manipulators profile 
voters to identify susceptible targets on social media, distribute 
micro-targeted advertising, spread misinformation about policies 
of the opposing candidate and try to convince unwanted voters not 
to vote. Automation plays a large role in influencing online public 
discourse. Publications like [68], [69] note that manipulators use 
both human-run accounts and bots [70] or a combination of the 
two [71]. Misinformation [72] and targeted messaging [73] can have 
transformative implications for the resilience of democracies and very 
possibility of collective action [74], [75].
Despite attempts by national and sub-national actors to apply 
algorithms to influence elections, their impact so far has been 
contested [76]. Yet, foreign actors and national political campaigns 
will continue to have incentives and substantial resources to invest 
in such campaigns, suggesting their efforts are unlikely to wane in 
future. We may thus inquire what kinds of technological progress 
would increase the risk that elections can be successfully manipulated. 
We can begin this inquiry by identifying what technological barriers 
currently prevent full-scale election manipulation.
We would identify those technological limitations by drawing on 
the expertise of actors who are directly affected by these bottlenecks. 
Those might be managers of online political campaigns and foreign 
consulting firms (as described in [8]), who specialise in influencing 
public opinion via social media, or governmental organisations across 
the world who comment on posts, target individual influencers and 
operate fake accounts to uphold and spread particular beliefs. People 
who run such political cyber campaigns have knowledge of what 
technological bottlenecks still constrain their influence on voter 
decisions. We recommend running a series of interviews to collect a 
list of limitations. 
This list might include, for example, that the natural language 
functionality of social bots is a major bottleneck for effective online 
influence (for the plausibility of this being an important technical factor 
see [8]). Targeted users often disengage from a chat conversation after 
detecting that they are exchanging messages with social bots. Low 
retention time is presumably a bottleneck for further manipulation, 
which suggests that improvements in natural language processing 
(NLP) would significantly reduce the cost of manipulation as social 
bots become more effective. 
We will assume, for the purpose of this illustration that NLP were to 
be identified as a key bottleneck. We would then seek to gather experts 
(e.g. in a workshop) who can identify and map milestones (or current 
limitations) in NLP likely to be relevant to improving the functionality 
of social bots. This will include machine learning experts who 
specialise in NLP and understand the technical barriers to developing 
more convincing social bots; as well as experts in developmental 
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linguistics and evolutionary biology, who can determine suitable 
benchmarks and the required skills, and who understand the order in 
which linguistic skills are usually developed in animals. 
From these expert elicitation processes we would acquire a list 
of milestones in NLP which, if achieved, would likely lower the cost 
and increase the effectiveness of online manipulation. Experts would 
then order milestones into a causal graph of dependencies. Given the 
interdisciplinary nature of the question at hand, we suggest in this 
case that the graph should be directly developed by the whole group. 
A mediated discussion in a workshop context can help to draw out 
different connections between milestones and the reasoning behind 
them, ensuring participants do not make judgements outside their range 
of expertise. A voting procedure such as majority voting should be used 
if no consensus can be reached. In a final step, experts can highlight 
milestone nodes in the final graph which are either marked by many 
outgoing nodes or are bottlenecks for a series of subsequent nodes 
that are not accessed by an alternative pathway. These (e.g. sentiment 
analysis) are our canaries: areas of progress which serve as a warning 
sign of NLP being applied more effectively in voter manipulation. 
Having looked at how this methodology can be used to identify 
warning signs of a specific societal impact, we next illustrate a different 
application of the method in which we aim to identify warning signs 
of a research breakthrough.
B. Second Illustration: High-level Machine intelligence
We use this second example to illustrate in more detail what 
the process of developing a causal map might look like once initial 
milestones have been identified, and how canary capabilities can be 
identified from the map.
We define high-level machine intelligence (HLMI) as an AI system 
(or collection of AI systems) that performs at the level of an average 
human adult on key cognitive measures required for economically 
relevant tasks. We choose to focus on HLMI since it is a milestone 
which has been the focus of previous forecasting studies [10], [15], and 
which, despite the ambiguity and uncertain nature of the concepts, is 
interesting to attempt to examine, because it is likely to precipitate 
widely transformative societal impacts. 
To trial this method, we used interview results from [11]. 25 
experts from a diverse set of disciplines (including computer science, 
cognitive science and neuroscience) were interviewed and asked what 
they believed to be the main limitations preventing current machine 
learning methods from achieving the capabilities of HLMI. These 
limitations can be translated into ‘milestones’: capabilities experts 
believe machine learning methods need to achieve on the path to 
HLMI, i.e. the output of step 1 of our methodology. 
Having identified key milestones, step 2 of our methodology involves 
exploring dependencies between them using causal graphs. We use 
the software VenSim to illustrate hypothesised relationships between 
milestones (see Fig. 2). For example, we hypothesise that the ability 
to formulate, comprehend and manipulate abstract concepts may be 
an important prerequisite to the ability to account for unobservable 
phenomena, which is in turn important for reasoning about causality. 
This map of causal relations and dependencies was constructed by 
the authors alone, and is therefore far from definitive, but provides a 
useful illustration of the kind of output this methodology can produce.
Based on this causal map, we can identify three candidates for 
canary capabilities:
Representations that allow variable-binding and 
disentanglement: the ability to construct abstract, discrete and 
disentangled representations of inputs, to allow for efficiency and 
variable-binding. We hypothesise that this capability underpins 
several others, including grammar, mathematical reasoning, concept 
formation, and flexible memory.
Flexible memory: the ability to store, recognise, and re-use memory 
and knowledge representations. We hypothesise that this ability would 
unlock many others, including the ability to learn from dynamic data, 
to learn in a continual fashion, and to update old interpretations of 
data as new information is acquired. 
Positing unobservables: the ability to recognise and use 
unobservable concepts that are not represented in the visual features 
of a scene, including numerosity or intentionality. 
We might tentatively suggest that these are important capabilities 
to track progress on from the perspective of anticipating HLMI. 
VI. Discussion and Future Directions
As the two illustrative examples show, there are many 
complexities and challenges involved in putting this method 
into practice.  One particular challenge is that there is likely to 
be substantial uncertainty in the causal graphs developed. This 
uncertainty can come in many forms. 
Milestones that are not well understood are likely to be composed 
of several sub-milestones. As more research is produced, the graph will 
be in need of revision. Some such revisions may include the addition 



















































Fig. 2. Cognitive map of dependencies between milestones collected in expert elicitations. Arrows coloured in green signify those milestones that have most 
outgoing arrows. See appendix for description of each milestone and dependency relations between one ‘canary’ node and subsequent nodes.
International Journal of Interactive Multimedia and Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 6, Nº5
- 106 -
which in turn might alter the number of outgoing connections from 
nodes and turn them into potent nodes, i.e. ‘canaries’.
The process of involving a diversity of experts in a multi-stage, 
collaborative process is designed to reduce this uncertainty by 
allowing for the identification of nodes and relationships that 
are widely agreed upon and so more likely to be robust. However, 
considerable uncertainty will inevitably remain due to the nature 
of forecasting. The higher the level of abstraction and ambiguity in 
the events studied (like events such as HLMI, which we use for our 
illustration) the greater the uncertainty inherent in the map and the 
less reliable the forecasts will likely be. It will be important to find 
ways to acknowledge and represent this uncertainty in the maps 
developed and conclusions drawn from them. This might include 
marking uncertainties in the graph and taking this into account when 
identifying and communicating ‘canary’ nodes. 
Given the uncertainty inherent in forecasting, we must consider 
what kinds of inevitable misjudgements are most important to try 
to avoid. A precautionary perspective would suggest it is better to 
slightly overspend resources on monitoring canaries that turn out 
to be false positives, rather than to miss an opportunity to anticipate 
significant technological impacts. This suggests we may want to set 
a low threshold for what should be considered a ‘canary’ in the final 
stage of the method.
The uncertainty raises an important question: will it on average be 
better to have an imperfect, uncertain mapping of milestones rather 
than none at all? There is some chance that incorrect estimates of 
‘canaries’ could be harmful. An incorrect mapping could focus undue 
attention on some avenue of AI progress, waste resources or distract 
from more important issues. 
Our view is that it is nonetheless preferable to attempt a 
prioritisation. The realistic alternative is that anticipatory governance 
is not attempted or informed by scholars’ individual estimates in an 
ad-hoc manner, which we should expect to be incorrect more often 
than our collective and structured expert elicitation. How accurate our 
method is can only be studied by trialling it and tracking its predictions 
as AI research progresses to confirm or refute the forecasts. 
Future studies are likely to face several trade-offs in managing the 
uncertainty. For example, a large and cognitively diverse expert group 
may be better placed to develop robust maps eventually, but this may 
be a much more challenging process than doing it with a smaller, 
less diverse group -- making the latter a tempting choice (see [45] 
for a discussion of this trade-off). The study of broad and high-level 
questions (such as when we might attain HLMI or automate a large 
percentage of jobs) may be more societally relevant or intellectually 
motivating, but narrower studies focused on nearer-term, well-defined 
applications or impacts may be easier to reach certainty on. 
A further risk is that this method, intended to identify warning 
signs so as to give time to debate transformative applications, 
may inadvertently speed up progress towards AI capabilities and 
applications. By fostering expert deliberation and mapping milestones, 
it is likely that important research projects and goals are highlighted 
and the field’s research roadmap is improved. This means our method 
must be used with caution. 
However, we do not believe this is a reason to abandon the approach, 
since these concerns must be balanced against the benefits of being 
able to deliberate upon and shape the impacts of AI in advance. In 
particular, we believe that the process of distilling information from 
experts in a way that can be communicated to wider society, including 
those currently underrepresented in debates about the future of AI, is 
likely to have many more benefits than costs.
The idea that we can identify ‘warning signs’ for progress assumes 
that there will be some time lag between progress on milestones, during 
which anticipatory governance work can take place. Of course, the 
extent to which this is possible will vary, and in some cases, unlocking 
a ‘canary’ capability could lead to very rapid progress on subsequent 
milestones. Future work could consider how to incorporate assessment 
of timescales into the causal graphs developed, so that it is easier to 
identify canaries which warn of future progress while allowing time 
to prepare.
Future work should also critically consider what constitutes 
relevant ‘expertise’ for the task of identifying canaries, and further 
explore ways to effectively integrate expert knowledge with the 
values and perspectives of diverse publics. Our method finds a role 
for the expert situated in a larger democratic process of anticipating 
and regulating emerging technologies.  Expert judgement can thereby 
be beneficial to wider participation. However,  processes that allow 
more interaction between experts and citizens could be even more 
effective. One limitation of the method presented in this paper is that 
it requires one to have already identified a particular transformative 
event of concern, but does not provide guidance on how to identify 
and prioritise between events. It may be valuable to consider how 
citizens that are impacted by technology can play a role in identifying 
initial areas of concern, which can then feed into this process of expert 
elicitation to address the concerns.
VII. Conclusion
We have presented a flexible method for identifying early warning 
signs, or ‘canaries’ in AI progress. Once identified, these canaries can 
provide focal points for anticipatory governance efforts, and can form 
the basis for meaningful participatory processes enabling citizens to 
steer AI developments and their impacts. Future work must now test 
this method by putting it into practice, which will more clearly reveal 
both benefits and limitations. Our artificial canaries offer a chance 
for forward-looking, democratic assessments of transformative 
technologies. 
Appendix
It is worth noting there are apparent similarities and relationships 
between many of these milestones. For example, representation: the 
ability to learn abstract representations of the environment, seems 
closely related to variable binding: the ability to formulate place-holder 
concepts. The ability to apply learning from one task to another, cross-
domain generalisation, seems closely related to analogical reasoning. 
Further progress in research will tell which of these are clearly separate 
milestones or more closely related notions.
Flexible memory, as described by experts in our sample, is the 
ability to recognize and store reusable information, in a format that is 
flexible so that it can be retrieved and updated when new knowledge 
is gained. We explain the reasoning behind the labelled arrows in Fig. 















Fig. 3. Extract of Fig. 2, showing one candidate canary capability.
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• (a): compact representations are a prerequisite for flexible 
memory since storing high-dimensional input in memory requires 
compressed, efficient and thus abstract representations.
• (B): the ability to reinterpret data in light of new information likely 
requires flexible memory, since it requires the ability to retrieve 
and alter previously stored information. 
• (C) and (E): to make use of dynamic and changing data input, and 
to learn continuously over time, an agent must be able to store, 
correctly retrieve and modify previous data as new data comes in.
• (D): in order to plan and execute strategies in brittle environments 
with long delays between actions and rewards, an agent must be 
able to store memories of past actions and rewards, but easily 
retrieve this information and continually update its best guess 
about how to obtain rewards in the environment.
• (F): analogical reasoning involves comparing abstract 
representations, which requires forming, recognising, and 
retrieving representations of earlier observations.
Progress in flexible memory therefore seems likely to unlock 
or enable many other capabilities important for HLMI, especially 
those crucial for applying AI systems in real environments and more 
complex tasks. These initial hypotheses should be validated and 
explored in more depth by a wider range of experts.
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